EU competition law in the regulated network industries by Ibáñez Colomo, Pablo
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2747785 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers at: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm and the Social Sciences Research 
Network electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2747785.  
© Pablo Ibáñez Colomo. Users may download and/or print one copy to facilitate their private 
study or for non-commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of this 
material or use it for any profit-making activities or any other form of commercial gain. 
 
 
 
 
EU Competition Law  
in the Regulated Network Industries 
 
Pablo Ibáñez Colomo 
 
Forthcoming in Jonathan Galloway (ed), Intersections of Antitrust: 
Policy and Regulation (OUP 2016) 
 
LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 08/2016 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Law Department 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2747785 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers at: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm and the Social Sciences Research 
Network electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=[number]. 
 
 
EU Competition Law  
in the Regulated Network Industries 
 
 
 
Pablo Ibáñez Colomo* 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This piece considers the interface between EU competition law and the regulation 
of network industries. The two have been transformed as a result of their interactions. It is 
difficult to make sense of contemporary EU competition law without taking into account the 
consequences that the liberalisation process has had on it. Similarly, regulation sees EU 
competition law as a model and an aspiration. In this sense, the two disciplines can be said to 
be mutually compatible. 
In spite of the compatibility between EU competition law and sector-specific regulation, 
there is tension between them. The objectives of the two are not identical. Regulation is 
conceived to undermine the position of the incumbent and to introduce fragmentation. EU 
competition law, on the other hand, seeks to preserve the competitive constraints to which 
firms are subject. As a consequence of this tension, the substantive standards in EU 
competition law may vary to accommodate the features and demands of network industries. 
Finally, it appears that EU competition law and sector-specific regulation have a 
complementary relationship. Sectoral regimes often lack the tools to achieve their objectives. 
The substantive scope of regulation may be limited, or the range of measures insufficient to 
address all concerns. EU competition law is a versatile instrument that can remedy some of 
these gaps. It has proved to be an effective tool to preserve fragmentation in liberalised 
markets and to manage technological change. 
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 2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The liberalisation of network industries has had a decisive influence on EU 
competition law and policy. Its evolution cannot be understood without 
considering the progressive opening to competition of sectors such as energy, 
postal services and telecommunications. Cases against incumbent operators make 
up for a significant fraction of the enforcement activity of competition authorities, 
and in particular the European Commission (hereinafter, the ‘Commission’). From 
a qualitative standpoint, it is apparent that, as a result of the liberalisation process, 
some substantive issues have acquired a prominence that they did not have in the 
preceding decades and that they would not otherwise have had. The nature and 
scope of intervention under EU competition law has, in other words, adapted to 
the features of network industries. Competition in these sectors is peculiar in that 
it often revolves around a segment that tends towards monopoly. As a result, the 
application of competition rules to them gives to unique challenges that have 
contributed to shaping contemporary debates in EU competition law. 
Conversely, EU competition law has inspired the regimes that were laid 
down in the wake of the liberalisation process. Sector-specific regulation in the 
network industries is based on the premise that effective competition is, in the 
long run, the best means to achieve the desired outcomes in terms of price, quality 
and innovation. Put differently, the default approach is that competition is the 
preferred form of regulation. Sectoral regimes have thus been devised with the 
overarching objective of promoting and preserving rivalry in liberalised markets. 
In the short run, the very purpose of intervention is to create of an ecosystem in 
which incumbent operators are subject to effective competitive constraints. 
Sector-specific regulation can be said to be truly successful where it is no longer 
necessary. 
Even though EU competition law and sector-specific regulation are based on 
the same — or compatible — premises, the intersection between the two regimes 
is often complex. The fact that they are compatible does not mean that 
intervention under the two necessarily leads to the same outcomes in practice. 
There are clear differences in the nature and goals of each discipline. Sector-
specific regulation is by definition more intrusive than EU competition law. There 
is a difference between promoting competition, which the former seeks to achieve, 
and preserving it. The need for ad hoc regimes arises in markets that not only have 
a tendency towards monopoly, but that have been protected by exclusive rights for 
decades. Thus, sector-specific regulation exists not only to introduce long-term 
rivalry on markets where none could have emerged, but to undermine the 
overwhelmingly dominant position of the incumbent operator. Intervention seeks, 
in other words, to alter the features of the relevant market(s) so that they conform 
to a preconceived vision. As generally understood, EU competition law is more 
modest in its reach and ambitions. More than engineering markets, its role is 
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 3 
confined to the preservation of the observable sources of competitive pressure 
that exist at the time when intervention is considered. 
On the other hand, it is clear that EU competition law is a valuable 
instrument to ensure that the objectives of sector-specific regimes are achieved. 
Ad hoc regulation may be more intrusive, but is also more limited in scope. There 
is often a mismatch between the range of measures that can be adopted under the 
sector-specific regime, on the one hand, and its objectives, on the other. For 
instance, regulation may be confined, from a substantive standpoint, to a limited 
range of activities, or may only be triggered in a limited range of scenarios. As a 
result, it may provide a partial and imperfect response to the demands and 
challenges of the industries to which it applies. It is therefore not surprising that 
EU competition law has played a fundamental role in recently liberalised markets. 
Provisions such as Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are more flexible — both in the 
formal and in the substantive sense of the expression — and thus allow for 
intervention in a wider range of contexts. Similarly, Regulation 139/20041 
(hereinafter, the ‘Merger Regulation’), preserves the fragmented market structures 
that these regimes seek to promote. The Merger Regulation can also apply to 
activities that fall outside their substantive scope. 
More importantly, the Court of Justice (hereinafter, the ‘ECJ’ or the ‘Court’) 
has interpreted competition law provisions in a way that ensures that they play a 
prominent role in the regulated network industries. According to the case law, 
competition law provisions must apply in the ecosystems created by virtue of a 
sector-specific regime in the same way that they would apply in any other context. 
The fact that such ecosystems are artificial, in the sense that they only exist as a 
result of regulatory intervention, does not make a difference in this regard. In 
addition, the case law and the administrative practice of the Commission suggest 
that the substantive standards are adapted to the features of recently liberalised 
industries. Conduct that is typically not anticompetitive may be unlawful where 
implemented by an incumbent operator. 
The remainder of this chapter explores these issues as follows. Section 2 
explains at greater length the reasons why EU competition law and sector-specific 
regulation can be said to be mutually compatible. This comprises both what can be 
termed the compatibility of objectives and of instruments. As pointed out above, 
however, the relative compatibility of the two disciplines does not mean that they 
are identical in the two abovementioned regards. The tensions that might arise 
between EU competition law and sector-specific regulation are explored in Section 
3. In turn, Section 4 addresses the complementary relationship between them. The 
concerns raised by commentators concerning the interaction between the two 
disciplines are briefly addressed in the conclusions. The analysis is not confined to 
a particular sector, even though the examples refer more often to some of them. 
                                                      
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2004] OJ L24/1. 
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This reflects the relatively greater prominence that, for different reasons, these 
sectors have acquired in practice. 
 
 
 
2. COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND 
SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION 
 
2.1. COMPATIBILITY OF OBJECTIVES 
One of the key defining features of network industries is the marked tendency 
towards monopoly of some market segments — generically referred to hereinafter 
as bottlenecks. This tendency is generally the consequence of the fact that these 
segments are natural monopolies. As a result, it is more efficient for a single 
operator to provide the services in question.2 Notorious examples of activities 
with natural monopoly features include the so-called ‘local loop’ in the 
telecommunications sector,3 railways,4 or the transmission of electricity.5 The 
bottleneck features of some industry segments are sometimes reinforced by 
network effects, which are known to exist where the value of a service for a given 
user increases along with an increase in the total number of users.6 Competition 
may not emerge — and if it does, it may not be easily sustained — within 
bottleneck segments. In addition, rivalry may not be easy to sustain in 
neighbouring markets, insofar as the firm controlling the monopolised segment 
may have the ability and the incentive to foreclose competition therein. 
Network industries are relevant for society beyond their purely economic 
dimension. This is arguably their second key defining feature. Access to electricity, 
water or electronic communications services are valued as a means to allow 
citizens to participate in society. As a result, governments often seek to ensure that 
a set of essential services is available throughout the country at affordable prices. 
As a rule, achieving this objective requires departing from normal market 
conditions. Absent governmental intervention, operators would lack the incentive 
to offer their services in remote and sparsely populated areas, or would only do so 
on terms and conditions that are more onerous. Sector-specific regulation 
addressing non-market considerations typically takes the form of a set of public 
service obligations that one or several firms are required to fulfil. 
                                                      
2 On the notion of natural monopoly, see Dennis W Carlton and Jeffrey M Perloff, Modern Industrial 
Organization (4th edn, Pearson 2015) 128–129. 
3 See Jonathan E Nuechterlein and Philip J Weiser, Digital Crossroads: Telecommunications Law and Policy in the 
Internet Age (2nd edn, MIT Press 2013) 25–28. 
4 Christopher Decker, Modern Economic Regulation: An Introduction to Theory and Practice (CUP 2015) 235–241. 
5 See for instance Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy 
and Practice (OUP 2012) 455–458. 
6 See in this sense Joseph Farrell and Paul Klemperer, ‘Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with 
Switching Costs and Network Effects’ in Mark Armstrong and Robert Porter (eds), Handbook of Industrial 
Organization, vol 3 (North Holland 2007). 
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The regulatory regimes created following the wave of liberalisations that took 
place in the 1990s and 2000s deal with the two abovementioned features in a 
manner that is compatible with the promotion of competition. This approach 
represents a fundamental departure from legacy regulation. For a long time, the 
bottleneck segments in network industries were assumed to require the creation of 
a legal monopoly that would cover all activities and that would be subject to tight 
regulation defining the price, quality and other conditions under which the services 
had to be provided. The award of exclusive rights was also deemed necessary to 
allow the legal monopoly to fulfil its public service mission through cross-
subsidies.7 Under legacy regulation, some profit-making activities subsidised loss-
making ones. 
The two key defining features of network industries are no longer assumed to 
require the award of exclusive rights across all activities. The purpose of post-
liberalisation regimes is, first, to introduce and preserve competition in — product 
and geographic — market segments that allow for it. Instead of awarding exclusive 
rights to a firm, sector-specific regulation typically seeks to curb the ability and the 
incentive to foreclose competition by the firm controlling the bottleneck segment. 
Similarly, these regimes are based on the premise that the fulfilment of public 
service obligations does not necessarily require cross-subsidies. These obligations 
can also be satisfied in a manner that is compatible with the promotion of 
effective competition on markets for profit-making activities. 
In post-liberalisation regimes, the number of market players is not limited 
artificially. As a rule, providing a service typically depends on a general 
authorisation, which does not require from the operator any more than a 
declaration to start an activity falling within the scope of the regime. Examples in 
this sense include the principles set out in the so-called Authorisation Directive 
(telecommunications)8 or in the Postal Directive.9 There may be instances where it 
might be justified to depart from this approach. This may be due to the nature of 
the activity (think of airline services10 and the generation of electricity11) or to the 
                                                      
7 See Case C-320/91 Criminal proceedings against Paul Corbeau, EU:C:1993:198, para 17: ‘the obligation 
on the part of the undertaking entrusted with that task to perform its services in conditions of economic 
equilibrium presupposes that it will be possible to offset less profitable sectors against the profitable 
sectors and hence justifies a restriction of competition from individual undertakings where the 
economically profitable sectors are concerned’. For an overview of the phenomenon and its compatibility 
with EU law, see Leigh Hancher and José Luis Buendía Sierra, ‘Cross-Subsidization and EC Law’ (1998) 
35 Common Market Law Review 901. 
8 See Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 7 March 
2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, as amended by Directive 
2009/140/EC [2002] OJ L108/21 (hereinafter, the ‘Authorisation Directive’). 
9 See Articles 2 and 9 of Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 
December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal 
services and the improvement of quality of service, as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC, Regulation 
(EC) No 1882/2003 and Directive 2008/6/EC [1998] OJ L15/14 (hereinafter, the ‘Postal Directive’). 
10 Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 
on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community [2008] OJ L293/3. 
11 See Articles 7 and 8 of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
2003/54/EC [2008] OJ L211/55 (hereinafter, the ‘Electricity Directive’). 
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features of the market (in the case of mobile telecommunications services, which 
require access to a finite resource12). Even in such instances, however, sector-
specific regulation lays down procedures to ensure that access to the market is 
made subject to objective, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures.13 
The idea underpinning free market entry and exit is that effective competition 
is the best means to deliver new and better services for consumers at lower prices. 
In this sense, the constraints that come from other market players are preferred 
over regulatory obligations dictating the terms and conditions under which a 
service has to be provided by firms. The latter is perceived to be a second-best 
instrument, which is typically justified in a narrow set of circumstances and, often, 
on a temporary basis only.14 The primary goal of sector-specific regulation is thus 
to create an ecosystem in which new entrants can constrain the behaviour of the 
incumbent. This goal is achieved through the isolation of the bottleneck segment. 
It is possible to think of a variety of techniques to isolate bottleneck 
segments. Some remedies are structural in nature, and thus more intrusive, 
whereas others impose behavioural obligations on the incumbent operator. The 
most intrusive form of regulatory intervention consists of placing the bottleneck 
segment under separate ownership so as to eliminate the ability and the incentive 
of the incumbent to foreclose competition.15 At the other end of the spectrum, 
authorities may impose access, non-discrimination and accounting separation 
obligations on the bottleneck operator.16 Other formulas explored over the past 
decade include what is known as the ‘functional separation’, whereby a separate 
business is carved out for the activities corresponding to the bottleneck segment.17 
                                                      
12 See for instance Article 5 of the Authorisation Directive. 
13 See in this sense Article 9 of Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 7 
March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC [2002] OJ L108/33 (hereinafter, the ‘Framework Directive’) and 
Article 7 of the Electricity Directive. 
14 For a clear example, see Case C-36/14 Commission v Poland, EU:C:2015:570, concerning the 
implementation of Article 3 of Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 
2003/55/EC [2009] OJ L211/94 (hereinafter, the ‘Gas Directive’). The EU Regulatory Framework for 
electronic communications is clearly biased against intervention at the retail level. See in this sense the 
Commission Recommendation of 9 October 2014 on relevant product and service markets within the 
electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services, C(2014) 7174 final (hereinafter, the ‘Commission 
Recommendation’). 
15 For an analysis of this remedy, see Ofcom, Making Communications Work for Everyone — Initial 
Conclusions from the Strategic Review of Digital Communications, available at   
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/.  
16 See in this sense Articles 10–12 of the Access Directive. 
17 On the different techniques that can be used to separate the bottleneck segment, see Martin Cave, ‘Six 
Degrees of Separation Operational Separation as a Remedy in European Telecommunications Regulation’ 
(2006) 64 Communications & Strategies 89. The relevant legislation defines ‘functional separation’ as an 
obligation ‘to place activities related to the wholesale provision of relevant access products in an 
independently operating business’. See in this sense Article 13a of the Access Directive. On the concept 
of ‘unbundling’, which is relied upon in the Electricity and Gas Directives, see Article 9 of the Electricity 
Directive. For an analysis, see Angus Johnston and Guy Block, EU Energy Law (OUP 2012), ch 3. 
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The re-regulation process that has taken place since the 1990s shows that the 
social objectives of sector-specific regimes are compatible with the promotion of 
effective competition. In the post-liberalisation context, universal service 
provisions ensure that all citizens have access to a given set of services at 
affordable prices and a specified quality. Instead of introducing price distortions 
and cross-subsidies, which preclude the emergence of effective competition on 
markets and areas that allow for it, the preferred approach is to compensate for 
the net costs incurred by the firm(s) in charge of universal service obligations. The 
operator in charge of such obligations may be compensated by means of State 
resources or by means of a fund created by other operators.18 
The above approaches are compatible with the logic of EU competition law. 
The primary purpose of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, on the one hand, and the 
Merger Regulation, on the other, is to preserve the competitive constraints to 
which firms are subject. As much as sector-specific regulation, these provisions 
rely on the competitive process to ensure that firms retain the ability and the 
incentive to lower prices and develop new and better products. In fact, sector-
specific regulation, by creating an ecosystem in which effective competition can 
emerge and be sustained, allows for the meaningful application of EU competition 
law. The Commission has focused on leveraging abuses resulting in the extension 
of a dominant position from the bottleneck segment to those open to 
competition. These practices include ‘margin squeeze’ practices, whereby the 
conditions of access to the bottleneck segment do not allow new entrants to 
compete on a related market,19 discrimination,20 as well as other constructive 
refusals to supply.21 
The approach to the non-economic aspects of network industries is also 
compatible with the logic of Articles 106 and 107 TFEU. Article 106(2) TFEU, 
allows Member States to depart from EU competition law provisions only insofar 
as their intervention is necessary and proportionate for the operation of a service 
of general economic interest.22 The purpose of the universal service provisions 
                                                      
18 See in this sense Article 13 of Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 7 
March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services, as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC [2002] OJ L108/51; and, in particular, Article 7 of the 
Postal Directive. 
19 The Commission defines a ‘margin squeeze’ as an instance in which ‘a dominant undertaking [charges] 
a price for the product on the upstream market which, compared to the price it charges on the 
downstream market, does not allow even an equally efficient competitor to trade profitably in the 
downstream market on a lasting basis’. See Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] 
OJ C45/7, para 80 (hereinafter, the ‘Guidance’). 
20 See for instance German Electricity Balancing Market (Case COMP/39.389) Commission Decision of 26 
November 2008 [2009] OJ C36/8. In this case, the Commission argued, inter alia, that E.On had 
‘discriminated between domestic balancing energy and import balancing energy’. 
21 See for instance Telekomunikacja Polska (Case COMP/39.525) Commission Decision of 22 June 2011 
[2011] C324/7 and Slovak Telekom (Case AT.39523) Commission Decision of 15 October 2014 [2014] OJ 
C314/7. 
22 For an overview, see José Luis Buendía Sierra, ‘Article 102 – Exclusive or Special Rights and Other 
Anti-Competitive State Measures’ in Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay (eds), The EU Law of Competition (3rd 
edn, OUP 2014). 
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described above is indeed to minimise, if not eliminate, the distortions resulting 
from intervention in markets where competition is sustainable. In fact, these 
provisions reflect the logic of Altmark, which defines the instances in which 
compensations for public service obligations do not grant an advantage within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU and thus do not qualify as State aid.23 
 
2.2. COMPATIBILITY OF INSTRUMENTS 
The liberalisation of network industries has led to a process of convergence 
between EU competition law and sector-specific regulation. The instruments 
through which the former achieves its objectives have changed to adapt to the 
features of the liberalised markets. Sector-specific regimes, in turn, endorse the 
tools and approach of EU competition law. One of the advantages of EU 
competition law over other disciplines is that enforcement is based on broad and 
vague provisions that can apply to a variety of scenarios and evolve seamlessly to 
address new challenges. Instead of providing for a closed list of infringements and 
a finite set of remedies, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU revolve around open-ended 
prohibitions. The same can be said of EU merger control, under which the 
Commission examines whether a transaction leads to a ‘significant impediment to 
effective competition’. 
In the telecommunications sector, the EU legislator chose to rely upon a 
principles-based regime. This preference is explained by the major changes that 
the industry was undergoing already in the late 1990s. It was clear at the time that 
technological evolution alone could deal effectively with some of the perceived 
concerns. Thus, instead of defining the bottlenecks requiring intervention and the 
required remedies, the EU Regulatory Framework for electronic communications 
(hereinafter, the ‘EU Regulatory Framework’) identifies the conditions under 
which intervention is justified and sets out the range of remedies that may be 
adopted.24 The need for, and the reach of, intervention, is to be established on a 
case-by-case basis by national regulatory authorities (hereinafter, ‘NRAs’). 
Action by NRAs under the EU Regulatory Framework is not fundamentally 
different from action by competition authorities. In essence, the review of markets 
required under the Framework is not fundamentally different from the sort of 
analysis that takes place in the field of merger control. Under the Merger 
Regulation, competition authorities examine whether a transaction will have a 
negative impact on firms’ ability and incentive to compete. The exercise under the 
EU Regulatory Framework is the opposite one. NRAs are required to engage in a 
prospective analysis to establish whether the relevant market under consideration, 
                                                      
23 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark 
GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht, EU:C:2003:415. 
24 See in particular Articles 14–16 of the Framework Directive. 
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defined in accordance with competition law principles,25 tends towards effective 
competition or whether, instead, intervention is required. The markets in which 
remedial action is justified under the EU Regulatory Framework present 
bottleneck features, which are identified in light of the so-called ‘three criteria 
test’.26 Regulatory intervention may thus be considered on segments that do not 
tend towards effective competition in the relevant time horizon, which present 
‘high and non-transitory’ barriers to entry, and for which the application of 
competition law may be insufficient.27 
The liberalisation of network industries raised new challenges for EU 
competition law regimes. The demands of the bottleneck segments have been one 
of the drivers forcing authorities to reconsider the nature and reach of remedial 
intervention. The wording of competition law provisions suggests that remedial 
action is necessary proscriptive — a practice is prohibited, a merger is declared to 
be incompatible with the internal market — and that it takes place on a one-off 
basis after an infringement is established. An approach to enforcement that 
conforms to the letter of the provisions would be appropriate in oligopolistic 
markets. Indeed, it suits well practices such as cartel arrangements and horizontal 
mergers, as well as some unilateral practices like predatory pricing. Effective 
intervention in these cases can take the form of a cease-and-desist order — and 
possibly a fine. 
Where competition revolves around a bottleneck segment, meaningful 
intervention may require remedies of a different nature. Insofar as access to the 
bottleneck is indispensable to compete on a neighbouring market, it may be 
necessary to impose a positive obligation on the incumbent operator. Access 
obligations, moreover, require by definition setting the terms and conditions under 
which the input must be supplied, as well as monitoring that the incumbent 
complies with them.28 Competition authorities are notoriously uneasy dictating the 
prices and other conditions under which goods and services are to be supplied.29 
                                                      
25 As explained in para 9 of the Commission Recommendation, ‘When carrying out a market analysis 
under Article 16 of Directive 2002/21/EC, the assessment of a market should be done from a forward-
looking perspective, starting from existing market conditions. The analysis should assess whether the 
market is prospectively competitive and whether any lack of competition is durable, by taking into 
account expected or foreseeable market developments’. 
26 Ibid, para 11: ‘The wholesale markets listed in the Annex may have such characteristics as to justify ex 
ante regulation because overall they meet the following three cumulative criteria, which have also been 
used to identify markets susceptible to ex ante regulations in the previous versions of the 
Recommendation. The first criterion is the presence of high and non-transitory barriers to entry. […] The 
second criterion addresses whether a market structure tends towards effective competition within a 
relevant time horizon. […] The third criterion is that the application of competition law alone would not 
adequately address the market failure(s) concerned. […]’. 
27 For an explanation, see para 12 of the Recommendation, where the Commission distinguishes between 
‘structural barriers’ to entry, which exist, for instance, ‘where the provision of service requires a network 
component that cannot be technically duplicated or only duplicated at a cost that makes it uneconomic 
for competitors’. Competition law intervention is deemed insufficient, in particular, where ‘the 
compliance requirements of an intervention to redress persistent market failure(s) are extensive or where 
frequent and/or timely intervention is indispensable’. 
28 See in this sense Phillip Areeda, ‘Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles’ (1990) 
58 Antitrust Law Journal 841. 
29 See in this sense, OECD, Excessive Prices, DAF/COMP(2011)18. 
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However, EU competition law enforcement in network industries has seen the 
application of these remedies in the past few years. Deutsche Bahn is an example in 
this regard The Commission put an end to the proceedings after the firm 
operating the railway infrastructure in Germany accepted to change the prices 
charged for traction current.30 
Remedies under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are typically behavioural in 
nature, whether this is a one-off prohibition or a positive obligation that requires 
monitoring. Structural intervention leading to the divestiture of assets by a firm 
remains exceptional. The possibility of adopting the latter was made possible by 
virtue of Regulation 1/2003.31 Article 7 enabled the Commission to require 
structural remedies ‘where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or 
where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for 
the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy’.32 It is precisely in the 
network industries that structural remedies have been required. In cases like E.On 
and RWE, the Commission put an end to the proceedings after the incumbent 
operator accepted, inter alia, the structural isolation of the bottleneck segment.33 
 
 
 
3. TENSION BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND SECTOR-
SPECIFIC REGULATION 
 
3.1. DIVERGENCE OF OBJECTIVES AND SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS 
EU competition law and sector-specific regulation pursue mutually compatible 
objectives. As already explained, the two disciplines seek to minimise distortions 
resulting from public intervention and are both based on the idea that effective 
competition is the best form of regulation. As a result, they can co-exist. This fact 
does not mean, however, that the objectives of EU competition law and sector-
specific regulation are identical. Typically, the purpose of the latter is to promote 
competition in markets that were formerly monopolised by the incumbent. The 
                                                      
30 Deutsche Bahn I and Deutsche Bahn II (Case COMP/AT.39678 and Case COMP/AT.39731) Commission 
Decision of 18 December 2013 [2014] C86/4. 
31 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] L1/1. 
32 For an analysis, see Frank P Maier-Rigaud, ‘Behavioural versus Structural Remedies in EU Competition 
Law’ in Philip Lowe, Mel Marquis and Giorgio Monti (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2013: 
Effective and Legitimate Enforcement of Competition Law (Hart 2016). 
33 German Electricity Wholesale Market and German Electricity Balancing Market and (Cases COMP/39.388 and 
Case COMP/39.389) Commission Decision of 26 November 2008 [2009] OJ C36/8 and RWE Gas 
Foreclosure (Case COMP/39.402) Commission Decision of 18 March 2009 [2009] OJ C133/10. For an 
analysis of the two decision, see Philippe Chauve, Martin Godfried, Kristóf Kovács, Gregor Langus, 
Károly Nagy and Stefan Siebert, ‘The E.ON electricity cases: an antitrust decision with structural 
remedies’ (2009) 1 Competition Policy Newsletter 51; and Oliver Koch, Károly Nagy, Ingrida 
Pucinskaite-Kubik and Walter Tretton, ‘The RWE gas foreclosure case: Another energy network 
divestiture to address foreclosure concerns’ (2009) 2 Competition Policy Newsletter 32. 
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point of EU competition law, on the other hand, is to preserve competition. This 
difference is not purely semantic. It has important implications for the nature and 
reach of intervention under each of the disciplines. It is also the main source of 
tension between them. 
Sector-specific regulation seeks to achieve its objectives by introducing 
fragmentation on liberalised markets. The point of the regime is not simply to 
create the conditions in which rivalry can emerge and be sustained, but to 
undermine progressively the position of the incumbent on the relevant markets. 
Typically, the success of sector-specific regulation is measured by reference to the 
number of players competing with the incumbent and the extent to which the 
market share of the incumbent has been reduced. Thus, an effectively competitive 
market is considered to be one in which the incumbent operator no longer holds a 
dominant position.34 In such circumstances, it is generally understood that 
remedies imposed under sector-specific regulation can be removed. 
These ideas are probably best illustrated in light of the principles set out in 
the EU Regulatory Framework. What triggers intervention under the Framework 
is the existence of a position of Significant Market Power (hereinafter, ‘SMP’) on a 
market that fulfils the ‘three criteria test’ as described above. Article 14 of the 
Framework Directive defines the notion of SMP by reference to the concept of 
dominance within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.35 Where, conversely, the 
NRA finds that the market is effectively competitive, in the sense that no firm 
holds a position of SMP, regulatory obligations are lifted. The expectation of the 
legislator is that market entry would progressively undermine the position of the 
incumbent, thereby leading to the incremental withdrawal of sector-specific 
regulation. This expectation is graphically captured in the ‘ladder of investment’ 
concept. According to this notion, new entrants in telecommunications markets 
would initially access the local loop at the lowest possible level and would 
progressively move up the ladder up until the point they invest in building their 
own infrastructure and compete head-to-head with the incumbent.36 
EU Competition law departs from this approach in several respects. The 
purpose of the discipline is not to undermine the position of existing market 
players but to ensure that they remain subject to effective competitive constraints. 
In other words, the point of EU competition law is not to alter the features of the 
                                                      
34 For instance, Ofcom’s strategy in the UK has been to promote ‘market entry and the emergence of 
scale competitors to BT in residential telecoms’. The success of the strategy is measured by the relative 
share of the market enjoyed by new entrants. See in this sense Ofcom, Strategic Review of Digital 
Communications: Discussion document (2015). For a comparative analysis taking the same perspective 
on the success of regulation, see James Allen and Ceri Tinine, Final report for Ofcom: International case 
studies (Analysis Mason 2015). 
35 Pursuant to Article 14 of the Framework Directive, ‘An undertaking shall be deemed to have 
significant market power if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to 
dominance, that is to say a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers’. This definition 
endorses the definition of dominance given by the Court in Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v 
Commission, EU:C:1979:36, para 38. 
36 See Martin Cave, ‘Encouraging infrastructure competition via the ladder of investment’ (2006) 30 
Telecommunications Policy 223. 
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relevant market, but to preserve the ability and incentive to compete of existing 
players. This approach to enforcement has two major consequences that make EU 
competition law stand apart from sector-specific regulation. First, market power is 
not challenged as such. It is only the strengthening of market power by means of 
an anticompetitive behaviour or a merger that triggers intervention. Secondly, 
fragmentation is not, in and of itself, an objective of EU competition law. 
Suffice it to compare, to illustrate the first idea, the difference that exists 
between Article 102 TFEU and the SMP procedure within the meaning of the EU 
Regulatory Framework. As already pointed out, the purpose of the latter is to 
progressively undermine dominant positions. As a consequence, regulatory 
intervention is not triggered by a behaviour or a merger. The features of the 
relevant market, and its evolution, are sufficient to justify remedial action. Article 
102 TFEU, on the other hand, does not prohibit dominant positions as such. It is 
the abuse of this position that is prohibited.37 Put differently, a precondition for 
the application of Article 102 TFEU is the existence of a behavioural trigger — or 
a State measure having the same effects.38  
It appears, in light of the above, that the fact that an incumbent enjoys a 
monopoly position over a bottleneck segment is not in itself a concern. Only the 
extension of the monopoly position by means of an exclusionary practice can 
trigger remedial action. The limits to intervention under Article 102 TFEU 
become apparent when one considers the case law on refusals to deal. The existing 
precedents suggest that such behaviour is in breach of Article 102 TFEU where it 
involves two vertically-related markets, and thus the leveraging of a dominant 
position — and not simply where a firm holds a dominant position in the relevant 
upstream market. Thus, what amounts to an abuse is the impact on competition 
on the neighbouring market. The same can be said of other related practices, such 
as ‘margin squeeze’ abuses, which are only prohibited under Article 102 TFEU 
insofar as they have an exclusionary effect on the relevant downstream market.39 
Market concentration is taken only as a very imperfect proxy for the degree 
of competition existing in a particular industry. As a result, fragmentation is not a 
concern, in and of itself, under EU competition law. For instance, an increase in 
market concentration is not prohibited by its very nature. Under the Merger 
Regulation, it would be necessary to show that a transaction leads to significant 
increase in the market power held by the parties. Similarly, an obligation to supply 
on a firm is not simply imposed because it is deemed desirable to increase the 
                                                      
37 Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission, EU:C:1983:313, para 37. 
38 Pursuant to Article 106(1) TFEU, which deals with the award of special and exclusive rights, Member 
States ‘shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in the 
Treaties, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109’. According to the 
case law of the Court, Articles 106(1) and 102 TFEU may be jointly infringed without there being an 
abuse by the firm that benefits from exclusive rights. See in this sense Case C-553/12 P Dimosia Epicheirisi 
Ilektrismou AE v Commission, EU:C:2014:2083 and Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron 
GmbH, EU:C:1991:161. 
39 Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission, EU:C:2010:603, paras 250–251. 
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number of players on a given market. A refusal to deal is only abusive where, at 
the very least, it leads to the elimination of all competition on the relevant 
downstream market.40 Where dealing with the dominant firm is not indispensable 
to operate on that market, a refusal to supply is not contrary to Article 102 TFEU, 
even if the alternative forms of access are less advantageous for rivals.41 Similarly, 
the exclusion of rivals is not always a concern justifying intervention. As a rule, the 
foreclosure of less efficient rivals is the consequence of the normal play of market 
forces and thus not unlawful.42 
The implication of the above is that substantive standards are significantly 
lower under sector-specific regulation than under competition law. Suffice it to 
compare the conditions under which access obligations may be imposed in the 
context of Article 102 TFEU and in the context of the EU Regulatory 
Framework. Because the latter is explicitly concerned with fragmentation and with 
undermining dominance, an obligation to supply may be imposed in circumstances 
that are considerably laxer than those that govern the application of Article 102 
TFEU to refusals to deal. Pursuant to Article 12 of the Access Directive, an NRA 
may impose an access obligation where ‘denial of access or unreasonable terms 
and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable 
competitive market at the retail level, or would not be in the end-user’s interest’.43 
 
3.2. THE TRANSFORMATION OF EU COMPETITION LAW IN THE REGULATED 
NETWORK INDUSTRIES 
The tension between EU competition law and sector-specific regulation has led in 
practice to the transformation of the former. An analysis of developments in the 
course of the past decade supports the conclusion that the substantive standards 
in EU competition law change when it applies in the regulated network industries. 
Indeed, EU competition law appears to adapt to the demands of markets in which 
incumbents have long been protected by exclusive rights and in which 
competition is fragile — either as a result of legacy regulation itself or due to the 
features of the relevant market. The Commission, with the support of the Court, 
                                                      
40 Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission, EU:C:1995:98, para 56 (hereinafter, ‘Magill’); Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner 
GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG, Mediaprint 
Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co KG, EU:C:1998:569, 
paras 41–44; and Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 
EU:C:2004:257, paras 40–47. 
41 Ibid, para 28. 
42 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, EU:C:2012:172, para 22 (hereinafter, ‘Post 
Danmark I’). 
43 Article 12 of the Access Directive reads:  
 
A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8, impose 
obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, specific network 
elements and associated facilities, inter alia in situations where the national regulatory authority 
considers that denial of access or unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would 
hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, or would not be in the 
end-user’s interest. 
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has interpreted the relevant provisions in a way that ensures that EU competition 
law contributes to the success of the liberalisation process. 
The development that best captures the observed transformation of EU 
competition law is the definition of the substantive standards that apply to ‘margin 
squeeze’ abuses by vertically-integrated firms. The choice of the legal test has a 
decisive impact on the role of Article 102 TFEU in the regulated network 
industries. Depending on the standard set, it may be a relatively marginal provision 
— as it is in the US — or a meaningful instrument to preserve effective 
competition in liberalised markets. In TeliaSonera,44 the Court was confronted with 
the question of whether the substantive standards that apply to ‘margin squeeze’ 
practices are the same than those that apply to refusals to deal or whether, instead, 
they constitute a stand-alone form of abuse. The implications of this question are 
important. If a ‘margin squeeze’ is subject to the same substantive standards that 
apply to refusals to deal, it only amounts to an abuse of a dominant position if a 
very strict set of conditions is fulfilled. As explained above, it would be necessary 
to show, at the very least, that access to the relevant input is indispensable for 
downstream competition and the practice leads to the elimination of all 
competition on the relevant market. 
The reasons why it would make sense to examine a ‘margin squeeze’ as a 
refusal to supply — and thus that it should be subject to the same legal treatment 
— are straightforward. A firm may refuse to deal with a rival outright or may 
instead chose to deal with the rival on terms and conditions that make it 
impossible for it to operate on the relevant downstream market — including by 
means of a ‘margin squeeze’. Accordingly, where a firm is entitled to refuse to deal 
with a rival, it should also be entitled to engage in a ‘margin squeeze’, which, from 
an economic standpoint, is an identical practice. The US Supreme Court endorsed 
this approach in linkline.45 It held that a ‘margin squeeze’ does not give rise to 
antitrust liability in the absence of a duty to supply or, alternatively, absent 
evidence that the retail prices charged by the vertically-integrated operator are 
predatory.46 
In TeliaSonera, the Court held that a ‘margin squeeze’ is a stand-alone form of 
abuse. Thus, a ‘margin squeeze’ may be abusive under Article 102 TFEU even if 
there is no evidence showing that the relevant input is indispensable for 
downstream competition.47 More generally, it is not necessary to show that the 
conditions under which an outright refusal would be abusive are fulfilled.48 The 
Court held that doing so would ‘unduly reduce the effectiveness of Article 102 
                                                      
44 Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, EU:C:2011:83. 
45 Pacific Bell Telephone Co v linkLine Communications, Inc, 555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
46 Ibid: ‘An upstream monopolist with no duty to deal is free to charge whatever wholesale price it would 
like; antitrust law does not forbid lawfully obtained monopolies from charging monopoly prices’. 
47 TeliaSonera (n 44), para 72. 
48 Ibid, paras 55–59. The ruling expressly discussed in TeliaSonera is Bronner. In Bronner, the Court 
considered the application of the Magill line of case law to a refusal to supply a physical input. 
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TFEU’,49 and that exclusionary effects may arise even when the input is not 
indispensable within the meaning of the case law on refusals to deal. The Court, in 
other words, interpreted Article 102 TFEU to preserve its role in the ecosystems 
created by virtue of sector-specific regulation. The apparent incoherence that 
results from treating outright refusals to deal more harshly than constructive 
refusals was only given secondary importance.50 
The Guidance on exclusionary abuses issued by the Commission offers an 
alternative rationale for the differential treatment of ‘margin squeeze’ practices and 
outright refusals to supply. According to the document, constructive and outright 
refusals to supply should, as a matter of principle, be examined in accordance with 
the same principles.51 It would be justified to lower the substantive standards, on 
the other hand, where the input to which access is requested has benefited from 
the award of exclusive rights and/or government subsidies.52 The Commission 
considers that, in such circumstances, an obligation to supply would either have 
no impact on firm’s ex ante incentives to innovate or that the sector-specific 
regime would have already struck the balance between short-term and long-term 
competition. 
As explained above, the Court has suggested in several rulings — including 
TeliaSonera — that Article 102 TFEU is only concerned with the exclusion of 
equally efficient rivals. As a result, practices such as selective price cuts are not in 
themselves contrary to Article 102 TFEU. They would only amount to an abuse of 
a dominant position if they lead to below-cost pricing.53 Similarly, the application 
of the ‘as efficient competitor’ test may provide a useful indication of whether a 
system of rebates applied by a dominant firm is abusive.54 There are some 
instances, however, where EU competition law is concerned with the exclusion of 
less efficient competitors. As the Court held in Post Danmark II, there are cases in 
which the emergence of a competitor as efficient as the dominant firm is 
‘practically impossible’.55 This may be due to the bottleneck features of the 
                                                      
49 In para 58, the Court holds that  
 
if Bronner were to be interpreted otherwise, in the way advocated by TeliaSonera, that would, as 
submitted by the European Commission, amount to a requirement that before any conduct of a 
dominant undertaking in relation to its terms of trade could be regarded as abusive the conditions 
to be met to establish that there was a refusal to supply would in every case have to be satisfied, 
and that would unduly reduce the effectiveness of Article 102 TFEU 
 
50 The Court interpreted Bronner in a narrow manner, as concerning a refusal to deal alone. As explained 
in para 57 of TeliaSonera, the Court held that, in Bronner, it ‘did not make any ruling on whether the fact 
that an undertaking refuses access to its home-delivery scheme to the publisher of a rival newspaper 
where the latter does not at the same time entrust to it the carrying out of other services, such as sales in 
kiosks or printing, constitutes some other form of abuse of a dominant position, such as tied sales’. 
51 Guidance, paras 80–81. 
52 Ibid, para 82. 
53 Post Danmark I (n 42). See, in the same vein, Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission, 
EU:C:1991:286, para 72. 
54 Case C-23/14 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, EU:C:2015:651 (hereinafter, ‘Post Danmark II’), para 
58. 
55 Ibid, para 59. 
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relevant market and of the regulatory landscape. In such circumstances, EU 
competition law may adapt and support rivals, even if they are less efficient. 
Sustaining market entry is, as observed above, the very purpose of sector-specific 
regulation. 
The administrative practice of the Commission suggests that EU competition 
law provisions are interpreted in a sui generis manner when they apply to 
liberalised industries. There are, in particular, several decisions in which the 
concerns raised by the Commission related not so much to the behaviour of a firm 
but to the features of the relevant market, and in particular the existence of a 
position of dominance at one or several levels of the value chain. Similarly, 
remedial action in some of these cases sought to address to change the structure 
of the market to undermine the position of the incumbent. In this sense, it is not 
surprising that intervention by the Commission has sometimes been perceived as 
an attempt to regulate the market through competition law enforcement.56 
E.On, mentioned above, is a valuable example in this regard. The 
Commission raised two separate concerns in the case. One of them related to 
practices on the German wholesale electricity market, in which E.On was found to 
enjoy a collective dominant position together with two other operators. The 
Commission argued that E.On withdrew generation capacity in the short term 
with a view to raising electricity prices.57 It was also claimed that the firm’s long-
term strategy was to deter investments by third parties on the market for the 
generation of electricity in Germany. What is notable about this case is that the 
declared purpose of the structural remedies was to eliminate the ability and 
incentive of the E.On and other players to alter the prices of electricity on the 
wholesale market. In this sense, the sale of generation capacity agreed upon by the 
firm looked like an attempt to undermine the collective dominant position of 
incumbent operators. As such, the remedy would fall outside the substantive 
scope of Article 102 TFEU which, as explained above, is not concerned with 
dominant positions as such. 
In another series of cases, the Commission has raised concerns that relate less 
to a practice by a dominant firm than to the fact that the market structure does 
not allow for the emergence of effective competition. Remedial action was thus 
closer in nature to intervention under sector-specific regulation. This tendency was 
to some extent apparent in E.On,58 but transpires more clearly in GdF Suez.59 In 
the latter, the Commission argued that GdF’s ‘strategic underinvestment’ in an 
infrastructure amounted to an abuse of a dominant position. In other words, the 
                                                      
56 See in this sense Niamh Dunne, ‘Commitment Decisions in EU Competition Law’ (2014) 10 Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics 399. 
57 German Electricity Wholesale Market (n 33), paras 28–40. 
58 In the German Electricity Wholesale Market, the concerns raised by the Commission relate, first and 
foremost, to the degree of market concentration on the relevant market. In para 82, the Commission 
pointed that the contested behaviour was the consequence of ‘E.On’s electricity generation portfolio’. 
59 Gaz de France (Case COMP/39.316) Commission Decision of 3 December 2009 [2010] OJ C57/13. 
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Commission argued that the firm had chosen to reduce competition by limiting 
the amount invested in import capacity.60 
Prior to GdF Suez, lack of capacity was considered to be an objective 
justification excluding the application of Article 102 TFEU to a refusal to deal.61 
This traditional understanding is compatible with the idea, outlined above, that the 
purpose of EU competition law is not to create new competitive constraints, but 
to preserve those to which firms are subject. If the existing market structure 
precludes the emergence of effective competition due to lack of capacity, it is 
difficult to say that the absence of rivalry is attributable to the behaviour of the 
dominant firm. In an approach that departs from this traditional understanding, 
the Commission held in GdF Suez that lack of capacity was not only not a valid 
justification, but the very concern justifying intervention. As in the cases discussed 
above, the remedy accepted by the authority sought to undermine the dominant 
position enjoyed by GdF Suez — as opposed to precluding the extension of a 
dominant position to a neighbouring market. More precisely, the firm agreed to 
share the bottleneck with rival firm by releasing at least 50% of import capacity to 
third parties.  
 
 
 
4. COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND 
SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION 
 
4.1. PRESERVING FRAGMENTATION 
EU competition law complements sector-specific regulation from an institutional 
and substantive standpoint. As explained above, post-liberalisation regimes aim at 
introducing fragmentation by undermining the dominant position enjoyed by the 
incumbent operator. However, these regimes are not always adequately equipped 
to achieve this objective. The most obvious limit in this sense has to do with the 
fact that sector-specific regulation typically applies ex ante — and often only ex 
ante. As a result, the actual behaviour of incumbent operator, or the attempts by 
the incumbent operator to circumvent regulatory obligations, may fall outside the 
scrutiny of NRAs. It is in such a context that reactive intervention through EU 
competition law may prove useful to preserve fragmentation. ‘Margin squeeze’ 
abuses and related practices capture the role of EU competition law in this context 
well. Slovak Telekom is an eloquent example. The Commission fined the Slovak 
                                                      
60 Ibid, in particular paras 29 and 40 (‘GDF Suez’s behaviour regarding the Montoir LNG terminal could  
be regarded as a refusal to supply an essential input by means of a strategic limitation of investments in 
additional capacity, and might constitute an abuse of its dominant position’). 
61 For an overview of this case law, see Pietro Merlino and Gianluca Faella, ‘Strategic Underinvestment as 
an Abuse of Dominance under EU Competition Rules’ (2013) 36 World Competition 513. 
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incumbent for obstructing market entry by delaying and making more difficult 
access to the bottleneck segment.62 
What the above cases reveal, in addition, is that there are institutional limits to 
what sector-specific regulation can meaningfully achieve. For instance, it is 
impossible to make sense of the seminal ruling on ‘margin squeeze’ and related 
practices — Deutsche Telekom — without considering the institutional background 
to the case. The German incumbent argued that, insofar as the wholesale charges 
were set by the NRA, the alleged abuse was not imputable to it, but to the 
regulator. More precisely, it argued that the NRA had examined the behaviour and 
had come to the conclusion that it did not amount to a ‘margin squeeze’.63 From 
this perspective, the practice would be, first and foremost, the expression of a 
failure of the ex ante regime, which proved unable to prevent the breach of Article 
102 TFEU.64 
Against this background, Deutsche Telekom is valuable in that it clarified that, 
from an institutional standpoint, EU competition law would be available as an 
alternative route to ensure the success of the liberalisation process. In the same 
way that TeliaSonera reflected a concern with the ‘effectiveness’ of Article 102 
TFEU from a substantive standpoint, Deutsche Telekom is a reminder that EU 
competition law provisions, as primary EU law, take precedence over national 
regulation and secondary EU law. The institutional consequence is that EU 
competition law and sector-specific regulation can apply alongside one another to 
the same concerns.65 It is only where sector-specific regulation does not leave 
firms any scope for action that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU would not come into 
play.66 
From a substantive standpoint, merger control has proved to be a particularly 
effective means to preserve fragmentation in liberalised markets. This is 
unsurprising if one considers that it is as a tool that shares some features and 
concerns with sector-specific regimes. Like Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the 
Merger Regulation is an instrument that requires the assessment of transactions on 
a case-by-case basis. Like sector-specific regulation, on the other hand, it applies 
ex ante and — perhaps more importantly — is concerned with market structures 
                                                      
62 Slovak Telekom (n 21). The case is pending before the General Court. See Case Case T-851/14 Slovak 
Telekom v Commission, pending. 
63 Deutsche Telekom (n 39), para 67. 
64 For an analysis of the ruling from a comparative perspective, see Pierre Larouche, ‘Contrasting Legal 
Solutions and the Comparability of EU and US Experiences’ in François Lévêque and Howard Shelanski 
(eds), Antitrust and Regulation in the EU and US Legal and Economic Perspectives (Elgar 2009) and Giorgio 
Monti, ‘Managing the Intersection of Utilities Regulation and EC Competition Law’ (2008) 4 
Competition Law Review 123. 
65 At the national level, there are different institutional models to deal with the interaction between (EU) 
competition law and sector-specific regulation. In some countries, including the Netherlands and Spain, 
the powers to enforce competition law and sector-specific regulation are entrusted to the same authority. 
In other countries, such as the UK, sector-specific regulators have the power to enforce (EU) 
competition law. See in this sense Competition and Markets Authority, Regulated Industries: Guidance 
on concurrent application of competition law to regulated industries (CMA10, 2014). 
66 Deutsche Telekom (n 39), para 82. 
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as such. Thus, transactions can be blocked before there is a change in the market 
structure. Alternatively, remedies can be designed to re-create the competitive 
constraints to which firms are subject and to mimic, if necessary, the sort of access 
obligations that are imposed under sector-specific regulation.67 
The enforcement practice of the Commission in the network industries 
shows that merger control is a very versatile instrument. The ‘significant 
impediment to effective competition’ test makes it possible to take action in 
transactions that would not result in the emergence of a dominant position but 
that would otherwise lead to a deterioration of the conditions of competition. The 
Commission has repeatedly raised concerns about the effects of concentrations on 
mobile telephony markets. T-Mobile Austria/Tele.ring is often mentioned as one of 
the first cases in which the Commission argued that the merger would lead to non-
coordinated effects, even though the new entity would not have been the market 
leader (or the dominant player).68 
In the absence of sector-specific mechanisms, EU merger control has applied 
to the wave of transactions which, across Europe, has led to a reduction in the 
number of mobile operators from four to three. In H3G/Orange Austria, the 
Commission required onerous remedies for the approval of a merger resulting in 
the creation of an entity with a market share below 25%. This is the threshold 
below which horizontal mergers are presumed to be unproblematic.69 Similar 
concentrations have been cleared by the Commission with remedies aimed at 
restoring the competitive constraints on the relevant markets affected by the 
transaction.70 At the time of writing, the Commission has signalled a hardening of 
its line, which has led to the collapse of some transactions71 and cast doubts on 
pending ones, namely Hutchison UK/Telefonica UK.72 
The potential of merger control to preserve fragmentation has become 
equally apparent outside mobile telephony markets. In Orange/Jazztel,73 the 
Commission examined an operation bringing together the third and the fourth 
                                                      
67 For an overview of such measures, see for instance the Commission notice on remedies acceptable 
under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 
[2008] C267/1. In para 62 of the Notice, the Commission explains that ‘it has accepted remedies 
foreseeing the granting of access to key infrastructure, networks, key technology, including patents, 
know-how or other intellectual property rights, and essential inputs. Normally, the parties grant such 
access to third parties on a non-discriminatory and transparent basis’. 
68 T-Mobile Austria/Tele.ring (Case COMP/M.3916) Commission Decision of 26 April 2006. For an 
analysis of the practice of the Commission, see Nicholas Levy, ‘The EU’s SIEC Test Five Years On: Has 
it Made a Difference?’ (2010) 6 European Competition Journal 211. 
69 Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria (Case COMP/M.6497) Commission Decision of 12 December 
2012 [2013] OJ C224/12. For an analysis of the transaction, see Antonio Bavasso and Dominic Long, 
‘The Application of Competition Law in the Communications and Media Sectors: A Survey of 2012 
Cases’ (2013) 4 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 264. 
70 See in particular Hutchison 3G Austria/Telefónica Ireland (Case COMP/M.6992) Commission Decision of 
28 May 2014 [2014] C264/6 and Telefónica Deutschland/E-Plus (Case COMP/M.7018) Commission 
Decision of 2 July 2014 [2015] OJ C86/10. 
71 See in particular Teliasonera/Telenor/JV (Case COMP/M.7419) [2015] C316/1. See Daniel Thomas, 
‘Danish telecoms merger shelved after competition concerns’ Financial Times (London, 11 September 
2015). 
72 Hutchison 3G UK/Telefónica UK (Case COMP/M.7612), pending. 
73 Orange/Jazztel (Case COMP/M.7421) Commission Decision of 19 May 2015 [2015] C407/18. 
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largest providers of fixed voice telephony and broadband Internet services in 
Spain. These operators faced strong competition from the incumbent — 
Telefónica — and from Vodafone (which operates a cable network in the 
country). In spite of the relative weakness of the merging parties, the Commission 
concluded that the transaction would lead to a significant impediment of effective 
competition. The high barriers to entry on the relevant markets, and the reduced 
incentives of the markets leaders to compete on price in the post-merger scenario, 
led to this conclusion. As a result, the transaction was only approved after the 
parties accepted to preserve the degree of fragmentation existing on the relevant 
market. More precisely, the parties accepted to divest a fibre network equivalent to 
that exploited by Orange prior to the operation and to give access to Jazztel’s 
ADSL network. 
 
4.2. MANAGING CHANGE 
Typically, sector-specific regulation is crafted, and revolves around, the concerns 
that are identified when legislation is passed. As a result, it may prove unable to 
cope with technological evolution. It is in the telecommunications sector that the 
role of EU competition law as an instrument to manage change has become most 
apparent. The EU Regulatory Framework was conceived as a ‘future-proof’ regime 
that would adapt to the evolving features of the industry. More than ten years after 
its adoption, it is clear that there were developments that it is not equipped to 
address. In spite of its principles-based approach to intervention, the EU 
Regulatory Framework was crafted on the assumption that access to, and 
interconnection between, networks would be the primary concerns justifying 
remedial action. 
The enforcement architecture of the EU Regulatory Framework is, by its very 
nature, unable to address to some issues raised by the process of technological 
convergence.74 This is so, in particular, because audiovisual content was left 
outside of its substantive scope of application. Content is not considered to be an 
‘electronic communications service’ within the meaning of the Framework 
Directive.75 As a result, the EU Regulatory Framework cannot give an appropriate 
response to the use and exploitation of audiovisual content to hinder the 
emergence of an effectively competitive market. An incumbent 
telecommunications operator may indeed acquire the exclusive rights to premium 
audiovisual content (such as top sports championships and Hollywood 
blockbusters) to gain a competitive advantage over its rivals. Its position may 
                                                      
74 Technological convergence has been defined as the progressive coming together of, and the blurring of 
boundaries between, the telecommunications, media and IT industries. This is a phenomenon that was 
well understood when the EU Regulatory Framework was proposed. See in this sense Commission, 
‘Green Paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology sectors 
and the implications for regulation – Towards an approach for the information society’ COM(97)623. 
75 See in this sense Article 2(c) of the Framework Directive. 
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become entrenched — even if the exploitation of a competitive advantage does 
not lead to anticompetitive foreclosure and the objective of promoting long-term 
competition may be jeopardised. 
Merger control is equipped to deal with the consequences of the integration 
of content providers and incumbent telecommunications operators. In November 
2014, the Commission referred to the Spanish competition authority the 
acquisition of DTS — the leading pay TV provider in Spain — by the incumbent 
telecommunications operator, Telefónica.76 The transaction was approved, subject 
to conditions, in April 2015.77 The remedies impose strict obligations in relation to 
the acquisition and the exploitation of TV rights to premium content by the 
merged entity. It limits, inter alia, the length of the period over which Telefónica is 
entitled to acquire the right to premium content. More importantly, it requires the 
incumbent to supply 50% of its premium channels to its downstream rivals on 
FRAND terms. Similar, regulatory-like, access obligations have been imposed in 
cases leading to the emergence of a quasi-monopoly on pay TV-related markets78 
and in cases leading to the integration of the leading pay TV operator with a 
broadband provider.79 
Another issue that had not been foreseen in the EU Regulatory Framework is 
the concept of net neutrality. It had not become a dominating theme when the 
Framework was adopted. According to the proponents of this regulatory principle, 
the operators of telecommunications networks should be prohibited from 
blocking, degrading or discriminating against content and services provided over 
the Internet. By the same token, network operators should not be allowed to 
favour affiliated or third-party services. The underlying premise is that innovation 
in the online world requires preserving the strict non-discrimination ethos on 
which it was originally based. Concerns about net neutrality emerged as a result of 
disputes between online content and application providers and network operators, 
and more precisely in relation to whether the former should compensate the latter 
for the use of networks.80 
When, during the mid-2000s, there were widespread discussions around net 
neutrality, it became clear that discrimination was not, in and of itself, a concern 
under the EU Regulatory Framework. If anything, the imposition of strict non-
discrimination obligations across the board, which is the approach advocated by 
net neutrality proponents, contradicts the logic of the Framework. In particular, 
such an approach runs counter to the market analysis procedure described above. 
As a consequence, it was necessary to introduce ad hoc provisions dealing with net 
                                                      
76 Telefónica/DTS (Case COMP/M.7313) Commission Decision of 25 August 2014. 
77 Telefónica/DTS (Case C/0612/14) CNMC Decision of 22 April 2015. 
78 Newscorp/Telepiù (Case COMP/M.2876) Commission Decision 2004/311/EC [2004] OJ L110/73. 
79 SFR/Télé 2 France (Case COMP/M.4504) Commission Decision 2007/784/EC [2007] OJ L316/57. 
80 On the notion of net neutrality, see C Scott Hemphill, ‘Network Neutrality and the False Promise of 
Zero-Price Regulation’ (2008) 25 Yale Journal on Regulation 135 and Filomena Chirico, Ilse M. Van der 
Haar and Pierre Larouche, ‘Network Neutrality in the EU’ (2007) TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2007-
030. 
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neutrality, which were only adopted in 2015.81 In the meantime, the response to 
net neutrality concerns came from EU competition law. In Liberty Global/Ziggo,82 
the Commission examined a merger between cable TV providers in the 
Netherlands. The merging parties accepted commitments aimed to ensure that the 
new entity would not restrict the ability of competing Internet-based providers 
(the so-called OTT players) to offer their services to end-users. In particular, they 
committed to maintain sufficient interconnection capacity for them.83 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is impossible to make sense of contemporary EU competition law without 
taking into consideration the liberalisation of network industries. From a 
substantive standpoint, some practices would be little more than an academic 
curiosity if these sectors were not open to competition. For instance, ‘margin 
squeeze’ abuses and similar conduct are only likely to arise in instances where a 
vertically-integrated operator controls a bottleneck that is difficult to replicate — 
that is, on markets that share their features with network industries. More 
generally, some of the debates that have dominated the discipline in the past 
decades reflect an attempt to rely upon competition rules to achieve, or to 
contribute to, the liberalisation process. 
The demands of network industries have had a lasting impact on the 
substance of EU competition law provisions. If there is an idea that emerges from 
the analysis above is that tensions between EU competition law and sector-specific 
regulation tend to be solved in a way that gives priority to the effectiveness of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU over consistency in the interpretation and 
enforcement of the two provisions. There are several examples that show that the 
Commission and the Court sometimes depart from the relevant substantive 
                                                      
81 Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 
laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on 
universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and 
Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union 
[2015] OJ L310/1. Prior to that, the so-called Citizens’ Rights Directive introduced changes that address 
some net neutrality concerns by means of transparency and quality of service provisions. See Directive 
2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 
2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy 
in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws [2009] OJ L337/11. 
82 Liberty Global/Ziggo (Case COMP/M.7000) Commission Decision of 10 October 2014. About the 
relationship between this case with net neutrality issues, see Oxera, ‘New powers for telecoms and media 
regulators? Part 2: convergence and regulation’ (December 2015) http://www.oxera.com/.  
83 Ibid, para 549: ‘the Notifying Party commits to maintain sufficient interconnection capacity for parties 
seeking to distribute data to its broadband customers by ensuring such parties have at least three 
uncongested routes into the merged entity's IP network in the Netherlands’.  
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standards to ensure that EU competition law has a meaningful role to play in 
liberalised markets. Thus, a constructive refusal to supply — which is the scenario 
that arises frequently in the regulated industries — is subject to laxer standards 
than an outright refusal to supply. Similarly, EU competition law may be enforced 
to preserve less efficient rivals on markets that heavily regulated markets that 
present bottleneck features. 
Institutional factors appear to explain the observed fluctuation of substantive 
standards in the EU. The Commission is simultaneously an authority in charge of 
the enforcement of EU competition law (and of preserving the consistent 
application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU across the EU) and the institution 
which proposes the adoption, and oversees the application, of sector-specific 
regulation. It is therefore unsurprising to note that it interprets and enforces EU 
competition law with a view to complementing and completing sectoral regimes. 
In systems dominated by public enforcement, like European ones, any resulting 
inconsistencies may be effectively confined to network industries. It is equally 
unsurprising that the Court sought to preserve the role of EU competition law in 
recently liberalised industries by holding that sector-specific regulation does not as 
such preclude the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In a system 
dominated by private enforcement, on the other hand, greater emphasis may be 
given to the consistent interpretation of competition law provisions. This factor 
may explain the observed divergences with US antitrust law. 
 
 
 
 
 
